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S U M M A R Y 
Abstract 
During the past two decades, various attempts have been made to implement changes in the 
Belgian electoral system. While most of these attempts met with failure, some minor changes 
were successful. In this article, we consider three cases in depth: demands for the abolishment 
of compulsory voting, the ongoing discussion about splitting the Brussels electoral district 
according to linguistic lines, and the introduction of an electoral threshold. We demonstrate 
that legal barriers and veto players are instrumental in explaining the odds that attempts at 
electoral reform will be successful. Belgium‟s consociational system does indeed impose the 
use of super majorities for some reforms and the in-built obligation of power sharing grants 
veto power to major but also to smaller political parties in every language group. The case 
studies also demonstrate that political parties often fail to estimate in a reliable manner the 
consequences of reform.  
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Introduction 
Implementing electoral reform is, at best, a risky endeavour since those holding political 
power obviously have a vested interest in maintaining an institutional status-quo (Lijphart & 
Grofman, 1984; Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). Advocates of electoral reform face various 
barriers in order to achieve their goals. In most cases, overcoming the veto power of elite 
political actors can be considered as one of the main barriers that advocates of electoral 
reform will face (Katz, 2005; Blau, 2008; Rahat & Hazan, 2011). This barrier will even be 
steeper in a political system where veto players are abundantly present and where the use of 
veto power is endemic in the political decision-making process. In this article, our goal is to 
apply the barrier model for electoral reform (or its absence) by focusing on the „hard case‟ of 
a consociational democracy like Belgium. The model assumes that various barriers will have 
to be surmounted before electoral reform can be achieved, and these barriers can be cultural, 
legal, or resulting from the opposition of vested interests or coalition partners. The strength of 
the barriers model is that it summarizes both institutional and strategic decision making 
approaches to political behaviour. It can be assumed that not all barriers are equally steep, but 
empirical analysis is called for if we want to determine in a more exact manner which barrier 
is most important in preventing electoral reform. An added advantage of the model is that it 
can equally be used to explain the success as the failure of attempts at electoral reform (Rahat 
& Hazan, 2011). 
The theoretical relevance of this exercise is that it helps us to determine whether the model is 
indeed successful in explaining the fate of attempts at electoral reform. The Belgian case is 
quite relevant in this respect. We consider the consociational nature of the Belgian political 
system (Lijphart, 1977; 1981; Deschouwer, 2004; 2009) as a good and illustrative example of 
the way in which institutionalized veto players raise the barrier of coalition politics. The need 
to maintain a coalition – and in a consociational system this is often a broad and power 
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sharing coalition – gives some parties the possibility to block reforms that they perceive as 
possibly detrimental for them. Lowering that barrier means that all governing parties must at 
some point agree not to use their veto. The presence and proliferation of veto players is 
therefore the most crucial barrier for electoral reform in Belgium. Furthermore a number of 
reforms of the electoral system require a constitutional change and thus a two thirds majority 
in the two houses of the parliament, which means that the legal barrier is sometimes quite 
high.  
The political tradition of joint-decision making, however, implies that also when a super 
majority is not legally necessary, the Belgian political elite aims for oversized majorities. This 
means every coalition partner can function as a veto player, i.e. “individual or collective 
actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the 
status quo” (Tsebelis 1995, 289). In practice, political decisions are very hard to take without 
the approval of the major political parties in both language groups, i.e., the Christian 
Democrats in the Dutch part of the country, and the Socialists in the French part of the 
country. The Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) and the Walloon Socialists (PS) are 
clearly the most powerful veto players in the Belgian political system, even despite the fact 
that their electoral power has eroded substantially during the past decades. Both parties are 
almost automatically part of the governing coalition. CD&V was a coalition partner in the 
periode 1958-1999 and again since 2007. The PS has been a member of the ruling coalition 
continuously since 1988. 
Surmounting both the legal and – even more – the veto players and coalition politics barrier is 
thus crucial for electoral reforms to be successful. If the barriers are not lowered, the status 
quo is the default outcome. And Belgium indeed offers a prime example of non-decision 
making as the basic layout of the Belgium electoral system (a two chamber Parliament with a 
D‟Hondt system of proportional representation and compulsory voting) has not been changed 
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at all during the 20
th
 century, despite the fact that various political leaders have labelled some 
provisions of the system as outdated. Nevertheless, especially during the last two decades, 
various minor reforms of the Belgian electoral system were implemented, e.g., with regard to 
the establishment of an electoral threshold or changing the system of closed electoral lists. 
These reforms can be considered as minor, since they do not have a direct effect on the key 
dimensions of the electoral process, i.e., proportionality, inclusiveness, the ballot structure and 
the electoral level or procedures (Jacobs & Leyenaar 2011). The barrier approach for 
explaining electoral reform leads to the hypothesis that in those cases, the presence of veto 
players in Belgian politics did not prove to be an insurmountable barrier for electoral reform. 
This might be due to the fact that these veto players apparently did not have sufficient reasons 
to use their veto powers. If we consider veto players to be rational actors, one can conclude 
that they hoped to benefit themselves from the proposed changers, or at least they did not 
consider their own interests unduly threatened by the reform (Dunleavy & Margetts, 1995; 
Boix, 1999; Renwick, 2010). 
In the next section, we present empirical material on the Belgian electoral system, before 
moving on to three case studies. In the case of compulsory voting, institutional barriers 
prevented political parties from reaching a super majority in Parliament. The ongoing 
negotiations about the redistricting of the Brussels electoral district, did not lead to changes 
either, because the two language groups did not reach a compromise on the issue. Our third 
case involves the imposition of an electoral threshold of five per cent in the year 2003, when 
all relevant political actors finally did agree on a negotiated package deal. We use these three 
cases to demonstrate that in a consociational democracy, legal barriers and coalition politics 
will be very strong barriers preventing the implementation of electoral reform. In our 
conclusion, we return to the question whether the barrier model can be used to offer a 
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convincing explanation for the development of electoral reform in Belgium, including both 
the failed and the successful attempts at reform.  
(...) 
Discussion 
The purpose of the barrier model is to allow for a systematic study of (attempts at) electoral 
reform in parliamentary democracies. In this article, our aim was to use this approach to study 
electoral reform in a consociational democracy, taking a hard case to ascertain whether the 
model is indeed successful in explaining the odds that electoral reform will succeed. In such a 
political system, the ubiquitous presence of veto players renders it extremely difficult to 
change the electoral system. Since usually electoral reforms are zero-sum games, there is 
always at least one party that stands to lose from the reform. If, because of institutional or 
cultural power-sharing arrangements, that party receives a veto right, implementing reform is 
rendered virtually impossible. Major electoral reform, therefore, proved difficult to achieve 
during the past decades. Various minor reforms, however, have been implemented, and most 
often the impetus for these reforms originated within the political elite itself, as there are very 
few examples of reform that came into being as a result of demands from public opinion. 
In this article we focused on barriers as a result of coalition politics, and, indeed they proved 
to be difficult to overcome. Apparently it is not just sufficient to obtain a simple majority for 
reform, it is also necessary that potential veto players do not use their veto power. From an 
analytical point of view, the legal barrier proved relatively easy to detect and observe, since 
the constitution itself lays out the procedures that have to be followed. The role of coalition 
politics, on the other hand proved far less easy to observe. During the past two decades, it has 
never occurred that a proposal reached a parliamentary vote and was subsequently defeated, 
which would lead to a visible use of veto power. The mechanism apparently operates in a 
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much more subtle manner, as proposals that run counter to the interests of a veto player are 
usually not even discussed in a parliamentary committee. Since the agenda of these 
committees is decided in a closed meeting of the Speaker of the Parliament with the chairs of 
the parliamentary party groups, it can be assumed that the proposal is blocked at this level. 
Since the minutes of this gathering, however, are not available for scientific research, this 
remains something of a black box explanation. The debate about the split of BHV however is 
an interesting case of a very open use of the veto power. The strong Flemish demands and 
electoral promises to simply split the district has met an equally strong refusal to do so by the 
Francophone parties.  
Our case study seems to demonstrate that barriers indeed can block most attempts at electoral 
reform. Since there is very little research available on the application of the barrier model for 
electoral reform, it is too early to ascertain whether this is a consequence of the consociational 
character of Belgian democracy, or whether our research findings could also be generalized 
toward other political systems. The successful example of electoral reform we discussed was 
the 2003 implementation of an electoral threshold by the Verhofstadt government. 
Verhofstadt managed to implement this reform by building a broad package deal in order to 
appease most potential veto players, either in or outside the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, the 
2003 reform was an exception to the rule, since the Flemish Christian Democrats were not 
involved in the final compromise. It has to be remembered in this regard that the 1999-2007 
Verhofstadt governments were highly exceptional in the recent political history of Belgium. 
In the 1958-1999 period, the Christian Democrats always had been part of the governing 
coalition, in a majority of cases even having the Prime Minister. For the other parties, the 
1999 electoral defeat of the Christian Democrats came as something of a relief, as for the first 
time they could envision a coalition government without Christian Democrats. Various issues 
that were blocked by the Christian Democrats were quickly passed, and Belgium became one 
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of the worlds pioneering countries with regard to euthanasia rights, gay marriage and adoption 
by homosexual couples. Seizing the same window of opportunity, Socialists and Liberals 
managed to get rid of small electoral circumscriptions. Technically, the Christian Democratic 
party at that time did not have a real veto power. The strange thing is that the Christian 
Democrats hardly made an effort to use their electoral strength. In Parliament their opposition 
was rather weak, and they certainly did not use all other legal means at their disposal to block 
the reforms of the Verhofstadt governments. Furthermore, when the Christian Democrats re-
entered federal government in 2007, the party did not make any effort at all return on all the 
reforms implemented by the Verhofstadt governments. Theoretically, therefore, it could be 
suggested that the Christian Democrats apparently did not feel threatened in a substantial 
manner by all these reforms. 
In this article, we have used these three cases to show that for political parties it is extremely 
difficult to assess in a reliable manner the consequences of electoral reform. Our three cases 
could best be summarized as a comedy of errors. First, with regard to compulsory voting it is 
difficult to predict what party would benefit from an abolishment. The argument that is most 
often invoked in the political discussions, that compulsory voting leads to the success of 
extremist parties, in any case is not substantiated by the results of empirical research. Second, 
with regard to the Brussels electoral district, both language groups stands to lose from a 
simple split, as their own minority groups will lose electoral clout. But apparently, harming 
the other language group is a more powerful incentive than pursuing one‟s own interests. 
Third, contrary to expectations the electoral threshold of five per cent did not prevent the rise 
of new small parties. It did mean that the Green party that felt safely above the threshold lost 
all its seats in the federal parliament. In every case, therefore, the judgement of leading 
politicians was clearly misguided. We do not wish to question the claim that rational choice 
approaches can be quite powerful in explaining the likelihood of electoral reform, as we did 
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not study these barriers in a systematic manner. Our case study has only demonstrated that the 
presence of veto players can limit the odds that attempts at electoral reform will be successful. 
Why exactly these veto players use their power, and whether this decision is based on rational 
grounds, remains to be investigated. 
 
